Abstract: On
INTRODUCTION
If you own a smartphone with a lock-screen passcode, you most likely use encryption or at least have the option to turn it on. 1 The extent to which that encryption is secure depends on a myriad of factors, most notably the device and its operating system.
2 Full-disk encryption, once an underappreciated and underutilized security feature available for smartphones, has proliferated in recent years. 3 Its increasingly widespread use as a default feature on newer devices is flooding the market with phones designed to be impenetrable when locked. 4 Since October 2014, versions of Apple's iOS and Google's Android, which collectively comprise over ninety-six percent of the worldwide operating-system market share for smartphones, have supported encryption capabilities originally believed to be impossible to circumvent without the owner's passcode. 2 See Cunningham, supra note 1 (discussing the effectiveness of comparable full-disk encryption operating systems offered by Google, Microsoft, and Apple as of August 2015); Ryan Radia, Why You Should Always Encrypt Your Smartphone, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 16, 2011, 11:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2011/01/why-you-should-always-encrypt-your-smartphone [https:// perma.cc/WBF4-BNJA]. 3 See Cunningham, supra note 1 (noting the prevalence of mobile operating systems that support full-disk encryption); Radia, supra note 2. Full-disk encryption is largely considered one of the most secure cryptosystems available for data stored on electronic devices. See Radia, supra note 2. Available in the form of both hardware and software, full-disk encryption converts everything on the hard drive, including the operating system, into an unreadable form until the phone's password is entered. See Wilson, supra note 1, at 7-8. 4 See Appuzzo et al. [https://perma.cc/YLT7-XJ67] (discussing the emerging market for smartphones specifically designed to thwart snooping governments, criminals, and corporate rivals, such as BlackPhone, RedPhone, and the BlackBerry Priv). 5 The new enhancements in device encryption are creating significant problems for law enforcement personnel, however, who are increasingly obtaining warrants to search the smartphones of criminal suspects and homicide victims with no means of executing those searches. 6 In the past, Apple had regularly assisted law enforcement officials in bypassing the passcodes of seized phones in response to a valid court order and search warrant. 7 That assistance, Apple claims, is no longer an option with updated phones because the newer encryption is designed to make it impossible for anyone, even company technicians, to access a locked phone without the passcode. 8 Additional security features, such as automatic data-wiping protocols, may nullify many alternative methods of hacking into phones. 9 Collectively, these newer impediments effecting law enforcement's ability to access stored data represent the most recent installment in a larger issue colloquially referred to as "Going Dark."
10 Generally, the term refers to the evolving gap between the government's authority to conduct criminal investigations and the ability to exercise that authority in light of technological advancements. 11 Enhanced encryption has reignited a simmering debate 6 See KRISTIN FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44187, ENCRYPTION AND EVOLVING TECHNOLOGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT INVESTIGATIONS 6, 7 (2016); Zakrzewski, supra note 5 (discussing investigators from across the country encountering problems). 7 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 6; Jason M. Weinstein et al., Privacy vs. Public Safety: Prosecuting and Defending Criminal Cases in the Post-Snowden Era, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 729, 744 (2015) . 8 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 5-7; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple's Evolution into a Privacy Hard-Liner, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 23, 2016, 8 :59 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/applesevolution-into-a-privacy-hard-liner-1456277659?mod= pls_whats_news_us_business_f [https://perma. cc/5AE2-M74C]. 9 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8; Orin Kerr, Opinion, Preliminary Thoughts on the Apple iPhone Order in the San Bernardino Case (Part 1), WALL STREET J. (Feb. 18, 2016) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/18/preliminary-thoughtson-the-apple-iphone-order-in-the-san-bernardino-case-part-1 [https://perma.cc/L7A8-4CWS]; see infra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the auto-erase function available on iPhones and the protection that function provides against brute-force forensic techniques).
10 E.g., FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8-9 (discussing the evolution of the "going dark debate," which originally centered on law enforcement's ability to intercept real-time communication, but has since extended beyond the realm of traditional and cellular telephone communications due to technological innovations in other areas, such as enhanced data encryption); Geoffrey S. Corn 11 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8-9; James B. Comey, Dir., FBI, Remarks at Brookings Institution (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-dark-are-technology-privacyand-public-safety-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/7JTL-BJRK]. The Going Dark issue has become two-pronged, and currently pertains to both real-time communication, or "data in motion;" as well as stored data, or "data at rest." See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 9; Comey, supra (discussing the "two overlapping challenges" pertaining to the Going Dark issue). Each type of data is protected by a different form of an encryption: for example, data in motion tends to be protected by "end-to-end encryption," whereas data at rest can be protected by the full-disk en-holding the All Writs Act as unavailable as a matter of law to direct thirdparty assistance in this context, which represents the first of its kind. 16 Although many believe that the issue will eventually be settled through legislation, the government's interim efforts to get into several locked phones has drawn much attention to the propriety of the All Writs Act and the federal courts' authority to command private assistance in order to effectuate a warrant. 17 This Note will discuss the federal courts' authority to issue orders upon third parties to provide technical assistance to the government under the All Writs Act, and the related implications within the debate regarding cellphone encryption of data at rest. 18 Part I discusses the encryption of data at rest on cellphones, particularly the type of encryption used on iPhones, and further discusses some of the constitutional and statutory implications that arise when law enforcement officials wish to search a cellphone. 19 Part II discusses the All Writs Act particularly its application by the federal district courts to compel third-party assistance. 20 Part III discusses In re Apple, Inc., in which Judge Orenstein denied the government's application for an order compelling Apple to provide technical assistance under the All Writs Act. 21 Part IV argues that the All Writs Act does authorize the court to order companies like Apple to provide technical assistance under certain circumstances, but that the ultimate solution to the encryption problem should come from Congress by expanding the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"). 22 cated that although the tool successfully opened the iPhone 5C at issue, it could not be used on newer iPhone models, such as the 5S or the 6. See id. 16 [https://perma.cc/QU3M-6MWX] (quoting executive branch officials' congressional testimony regarding Going Dark and the government's proceedings against Apple); Hong, supra note 14 (discussing ongoing proceedings of March 2016). On February 29, 2016, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives to establish a legislative advisory commission comprised of individuals from various fields to investigate the cellphone encryption issues and provide recommendations to Congress. See H.R. 4651, 114th Cong. (2016) . 18 See infra notes 23-222 and accompanying text. 19 See infra notes 30-86 and accompanying text. 20 See infra notes 92-142 and accompanying text. 21 See infra notes 149-170 and accompanying text. 22 See infra notes 181-222 and accompanying text.
I. ENCRYPTION, GOING DARK, AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY IMPLICATIONS OF SEARCHING A LOCKED SMARTPHONE
Although government officials have decried the problem of "Going Dark" for well over a decade, up until recently, such concerns were not necessarily focused on digital data at rest, contained on cellphones, but rather digital data in motion. 23 Accordingly, recent improvements in encryption protecting data at rest have brought a slew of new obstacles that law enforcement must now navigate throughout the course of otherwise routine investigations. 24 This Part discusses cellphone data encryption and the investigative impediments that it creates for law enforcement officials. 25 Section A of this Part provides a brief overview of data encryption and its use in smartphones.
26 Section B discusses the evolution of the data encryption on Apple's iOS operating systems for iPhones and the current capabilities of the encryption technology on iOS 8 and higher.
27 Section C provides a brief overview of the constitutional implications involved in governmental cellphone searches. 28 Finally, Section D discusses the potentially relevant federal statutes implicated in searching an encrypted cellphone and more background on the Going Dark debate.
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A. What Is Encryption?
Encryption is the transformation of a plaintext message, by some predesigned protocol, into an enciphered form, known as "ciphertext," in such a way that hides the substance of its content. 30 Similarly, decryption is the inverse process of recapturing the content of that message. 31 The "crypto- 31 CZESŁAW KOŚCIELNY ET AL., MODERN CRYPTOGRAPHY PRIMER 1 (2013). "Protocol" is an operation that transforms the message into an unintelligible string of ciphertext, generally by applying some form of mathematical function. See id. at 37; Vagle, supra note 30, at 117. Together, the encryption and decryption algorithms form a "cipher," or "cryptosystem," with the goal of providing secret communication. See KOŚCIELNY ET AL., supra, at 3. graphic key" is an additional input component known only to the designer and user, and its strength is crucial to a cipher's effectiveness. 32 Today, encryption technology ("cryptography") is widely used by governments, businesses, and individuals throughout the world on a wide range of devices, increasingly including smartphones. 33 In terms of reliable and practical cryptography, one of the earliest types of encryption software available for stored data on smartphones was full-disk encryption ("FDE").
34 FDE functions by converting everything on a phone's hard drive, including the operating system, into unreadable ciphertext until the phone's password is entered. 35 Until recent years, few hardware-based FDE services were available for smartphones, but they have now become more widespread.
36
B. An Apple Falls into the Darkness: Apple's Encryption and Going Dark
The encryption technology used on Apple's iPhones has evolved from fairly rudimentary to highly sophisticated and secure due to the steady implementation of increasingly better variations of FDE and remote wiping capabilities over the past decade. 37 Until the release of iOS 8 in October 32 KOŚCIELNY ET AL., supra note 31, at 3. A key usually takes the form of a number, but can be a representation of any value, and its strength is critical because most algorithms and protocols are publicly known and can be analyzed by experts. Id.
33 E.g., Vagle, supra note 30, at 120-22. Today, modern encryption is available for smartphones in a variety forms: software, hardware, and built-in encryption in operating systems. See id. at 119; Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 20. Encryption designed to protect data on hard drives can be further grouped into two general categories: "file-level encryption" and "disk-level encryption." Folkinshteyn, supra note 30, at 379; Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 20. 34 See Radia, supra note 2. In comparison, "end-to-end encryption" protects data in transit between users, such as email and message services. See Jon Czas, Note: Business, Law, and Project Prism, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 897, 898 & n.11 (2014). Real-time interception of communications protected by end-to-end encryption, such as phone calls and emails, which is provided by telecommunications carriers and broadband providers, is governed at the federal level by the Communication Assistance for Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA"). See Comey, supra note 11; see also 47 U.S.C. § § 1001-10 (2012) (CALEA).
35 E.g., KAREN SCARFONE ET AL., GUIDE TO STORAGE ENCRYPTION TECHNOLOGIES FOR END USER DEVICES 3-1 (2007); Wilson, supra note 1, at 7-8. Full-disk encryption, or disk-level encryption, is distinguishable from file-level encryption in that it encrypts everything on a hard drive, rather than individual files. Folkinshteyn, supra note 30, at 379; Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 20. File-level encryption, often offered as smartphone applications, has at times been considered to offer less security, because any data outside one of those files is not protected. See Radia, supra note 2. 36 See Ries & Simek, supra note 11, at 21; Radia, supra note 2. On hardware-based systems, the cryptographic keys are stored on the hard drive instead of the computer's memory, which makes key recovery more difficult and curbs the risk of malware and other threats. See SCARFONE ET AL., supra note 35, at 3-2 to -3. Additionally, hard-ware based systems can only be managed locally, whereas software-based FDE can be centrally managed on a remote server. See id. at 3-2. 37 See Jacqui Cheng, Can Apple Give Police a Key to Your Encrypted iPhone Data? Ars Investigates, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 4, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/apple/2012/04/can-apple-give-police-akey-to-your-encrypted-iphone-data-ars-investigates [https://perma.cc/SGU7-U7YZ]; Radia, supra 2014, Apple possessed the capabilities to bypass any iPhone's lock screen passcode and turn over certain data-SMS iMessages, MMS, photos, videos, contacts, call history, etc.-to authorities in response to a search warrant. 38 Alternatively, authorities possessed the ability in many cases to guess a phone's passcode using simple forensic tools. 39 As part of the iOS 8 rollout, Apple announced an update in its privacy policy, which claimed that under the new encryption system "it's not technically feasible" for the company to cooperate with government warrants for the extraction of personal data. 40 Like previous versions, iOS 8 is equipped with "Data Protection" software that encrypts individual applications/files using an encryption key, which is derived from an entanglement of the user-created password and an ID number, unique to each iPhone ("UID"). 41 The encryption key is the product of running both the password and the UID through a key derivation function calibrated with an 80-millisecond iteration count, which makes each attempt at unlocking the device slower. 42 Apple estimates that a bruteforce attack at trying all possible combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode may take up to 5½ years to complete, depending on the passcode's strength. 43 The principal difference between iOS 8 and previous versions is that under iOS 8, more data-sensitive applications receive that encryption by default, which Apple cannot extract by circumventing the passcode. 44 Further protection can be enabled by activating a feature from the settings menu that will permanently wipe all of the data from a phone in the event a password is entered incorrectly ten consecutive times. 45 The data encryption keys for recent iPhones-5S, 6, 6 Plus, 6S, or 6S Plus-are now stored in a hardware-based encryption co-processor, known as the "Secure Enclave." 46 Apple claims that it does not possess the capability to break into an iPhone's Secure Enclave; but to do so, security experts have noted that a type of digital "skeleton key" would have to have been designed to which only the company has access, colloquially known as a "backdoor."
47 Backdoors in any cryptosystem raise serious security concerns, because it is difficult to ensure that the intended access point will not be discovered and exploited by hackers or foreign intelligence agencies.
48
Google also initially reported in 2014 that the next version of its Android operating system, "Android 5.0 Lollipop," would support full-disk encryption by default. 49 These moves from the two tech-giants reflect the 44 50 Although such efforts have been generally lauded by privacy advocates, many government officials have cautioned that such widespread encryption may make it impossible for police to execute search warrants on lawfully seized devices. 51 Federal and state law enforcement officials have repeatedly emphasized the danger in expressly marketing products that enable terrorists and domestic criminals to place themselves beyond the reach of the law.
52
The debate over Going Dark, which continues to play out before the federal judiciary and congressional committees, presents unique and profoundly important questions regarding the appropriate balance between private and public security under the Fourth Amendment.
53
C. Federal Constitutional Implications Involved in Searching a Smartphone
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees people the right to be free from certain kinds of governmental intrusion, namely unreasonable searches and seizures. 54 In the context of a search, this protection REV. 1981 REV. , 1986 REV. -87 (2015 (discussing the particularity element of the warrant requirement, which is satisfied by articulable descriptions of "the place to be searched" and "the people or things to be seized" (quoting the Fourth Amendment)). 57 See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913-14 (1984) (holding that "great deference" should be given to a magistrate's issuance of a warrant, but that deference does not preclude further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding its application and issuance); see also forcement officials regularly sought and obtained search warrants before searching seized cellphones. 59 Many have opined that recent and continuing advancements in device-encryption could pose a danger to public safety and threaten the time-honored functionality of the warrant requirement, if potentially probative evidence can no longer be lawfully obtained without the phone's password. 60 Some argue that an impenetrable barrier to lawful warrant executions is fundamentally inconsistent with the fulcrum of the Fourth Amendment. 61 These concerns fit neatly under the already existent problem of Going Dark, which signifies law enforcement's inability to access certain data and communications-in this case, for example, contents of encrypted electronic devices. 62 Some have deflected such criticism by suggesting there are methods available to authorities that would allow them to get into seized devices, such as obtaining the passcode from the phone's owner or utilizing cryptanalytic techniques. 63 The former solution may be a nullity, however, as the only federal appeals court to have ruled on the matter held that compelling the owner of an electronic device to divulge his or her password is precluded by the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause. 64 Furthermore, the viability of existing forensic techniques, such as brute-force, is 59 See In re Search of White Apple iPhone, Model A1332, No. C-12-224M, 2012 WL 2945996, at *1-2, (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) (denying government's application for a warrant to search defendant's iPhone, which had been taken into custody as a result of his arrest); Lemke, 2008 WL 4999246, at *7 (discussing the circumstances surrounding the search of a cellphone seized incident to an arrest, which included securing the cellphone in the arresting officer's desk until a warrant was obtained). 60 . 61 Corn, supra note 10, at 1439 ("[T]he people have never had an absolute and unqualified right to privacy but instead a right to be secure against unreasonable government intrusions . . . ."). 62 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8-9; Comey, supra note 11; see supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing the Going Dark challenges that face law enforcement with increasingly robust encryption of data at rest). 63 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 8, 11. difficult to fully ascertain because such techniques tend to be very device specific due to variable features, such as the auto-erase function.
65
D. Apples and Oranges: Relevant, but Inapposite Federal Statutes
Currently, there is no federal statute that explicitly covers the propriety of compelling third-party manufacturers to bypass the passcodes of locked mobile devices to provide access for the government. 66 Nevertheless, there are two federal laws that arguably come close. 67 The first is the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), which was enacted under Title II of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") in 1986. 68 Among other things, the SCA governs when government actors may compel network service providers to disclose stored electronic communications. 69 This most likely does not apply to governmental requests for assistance in bypassing the lock-screen of devices, however, because the password itself is not an "electronic communication" held by the third-party service provider. Second, there is the CALEA, enacted in 1994, which mandates that telecommunications carriers, broadband, and Voice over Internet Protocol providers design their equipment, facilities, and services to ensure that their networks are technologically amenable to government wiretap orders. 71 This generally requires carriers to maintain built-in surveillance capabilities in their networks to allow the government to monitor and access communications in real-time. 72 Specifically, a carrier must be able to isolate and intercept wire and electronic communications transmitted within its network, and it must possess the capability to either deliver those communications to law enforcement personnel or enable the government access on its own. 73 It further requires carriers to facilitate authorized access to call-identifying information that is reasonably available to the carrier. 74 Furthermore, it mandates carriers to consult with transmission equipment manufacturers and support services as necessary to ensure compliance, and requires those manufacturers and support services to cooperate. 75 Lastly, CALEA only requires built-in capabilities for access, it is not a blanket authorization for governmental access, which must be predicated by some independent court order.
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One notable statutory limitation is that CALEA explicitly excludes from coverage "persons or entities insofar as they are engaged in providing information services," which includes internet service providers, email services, and electronic publishing services. 77 Secondly, carriers are not responsible for decrypting any encrypted communication unless the cryptosystem was provided by the carrier and the carrier possesses the information necessary to decrypt the communication.
78 Therefore, CALEA does not apply to password encrypted devices and the underlying data at rest, because it is explicitly limited to the interception of real-time communications and call-identifying information transmitted by telecommunications carriers. 79 The possibility of updating and expanding CALEA to cover companies like Apple 173, 178 (2014) . 80 See King, supra note 79, at 178-79. A proposal to expand CALEA to cover all communications service providers-including e-mail service providers, social networking sites, and peer-to-peer messaging services was drafted by the FBI and approved by the DOJ in or around 2009. Id. at 179. The proposal was never sent to Congress. Id. Discussions as late as 2012 had primarily been focused on encryption's debilitating effect on the government's ability to conduct wiretaps for e-mail ser-pertains to wiretapping, the story behind its adoption and effect is analogous to the current challenges presented by enhanced encryption of data at rest. 81 Many federal officials seem to be in agreement that a legislative solution of some kind will eventually be needed. 82 Cryptographers and security experts have consistently cautioned against any legislatively mandated "back door" because it would materially weaken security. 83 The Obama administration indicated in October 2015 that it would not pursue legislation just yet, but would instead continue conversations with the tech industry, which have since remained ongoing amidst several congressional hearings. 84 In the interim, there are still phones that the government has seized that it cannot access, and federal prosecutors have largely turned to the judiciary for more immediate relief. 85 orders to direct Apple, and other unknown vendors, to provide technical assistance in gaining access to encrypted devices in over seventy cases. 86 
II. THE ALL WRITS ACT
In those seventy-plus cases, the government has filed its order-applications under a statute known as the All Writs Act, which has occasionally been used to order third-party assistance to the government in other similar contexts since the 1970s. 87 This Part discusses the legal authority behind the government's efforts to conscript third-party decryption assistance in order to execute device search warrants.
88 Section A of this Part provides a brief historical overview of the All Writs Act and background discussion of the Act as a source of injunctive relief.
89 Section B discusses specific requirements that must be satisfied by a party seeking an All Writs injunction in the federal district courts.
90 Section C discusses the federal courts' authority under the Act to compel third-party assistance to the government.
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A. Historical & Procedural Overview of the All Writs Act
The All Writs Act, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), provides in its entirety: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usage and principles of law." 92 The Act traces its lineage, in substance, back to two sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The fundamental purpose of the All Writs Act has been to supply the federal courts with the procedural tools necessary to perform their duty and protect their respective jurisdictions. 94 As interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, the All Writs Act empowers a federal court to issue any writ that may be "necessary or appropriate" to help effectuate a previously issued order. 95 For example, if parties of an action were free to ignore a court judgment or order, the issuing court's ability to perform its duties would be undermined. 96 Thus, if a litigant's conduct can be properly characterized as violating a previously issued court order, the issuing court has jurisdiction to enjoin that conduct. 97 Furthermore, this power may also extend to persons or entities who, though not parties to the original action or engaged in any wrongdoing, are in a position to frustrate the implementation of a court order or to thwart the administration of justice. In the district courts, orders under the All Writs Act typically take the form of an injunction, and may only be issued when necessary to protect the court's underlying subject matter jurisdiction. 99 Thus, as courts with limited original jurisdiction, federal district courts can only issue orders under the Act in aid of that jurisdiction acquired on some independent ground. 100 Procedurally, the Act enables district courts to issue injunctions under two distinct circumstances: (1) to safeguard ongoing proceedings; and (2) to effectuate already-issued orders and judgments. 101 In either situation a district court's jurisdiction has already been established; thus, when some conduct threatens to undermine the court's abilities to perform its duties it may issue an "ancillary injunction" under the Act to enjoin that conduct and preserve its jurisdiction.
102
The All Writs injunction is slightly distinct from alternative forms of injunctive relief, such as traditional injunctions and statutory injunctions. 2000) ; see also 1-10A MOORE'S MANUAL, supra note 99, § 10A.05 (defining "ancillary injunction" as an injunction "used by a federal court to sustain its jurisdiction"). The converse is also true, if lack of conduct would tend to undermine a court's ability to perform its duties, such as ignoring an order or judgment, the court may issue an injunction requiring the party to comply or carry out the terms of the judgment. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 187 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); see also In re Y & A Grp. Sec. Litig., 38 F.3d 380, 382 (8th Cir. 1994) ("All Writs Act indirectly confers on injunction beneficiaries the right to judicial enforcement."). 103 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100-02; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299-301. There are at least three different types of injunctions a federal court can issue: a "traditional injunction," a statutory injunction, or an injunction under the All Writs Act. Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097-99; see Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300. A traditional injunction can be issued as either interim or permanent relief predi-First, a traditional injunction is predicated upon some cause of action, whereas an All Writs injunction is predicated upon some identifiable threat to the integrity of an ongoing proceeding, or previously issued order or judgment.
104 Secondly, the primary purpose of an All Writs injunction is to protect the integrity of the court and its jurisdiction, rather than to protect the rights of individuals. 105 That is not to say, however, that a district court may evade the more stringent requirements of other applicable forms of injunctive relief by purporting to issue an All Writs injunction. 106 The Act is firmly regarded as a remedy of last resort. 107 No one clear test or standard for the All Writs Act has been consistently articulated, but the general purpose and fundamental limitations underlying the Act have received relatively consistent, piecemeal application. 108 cated upon a cause of action, whether it be an alleged breach of common law, statutory, or constitutional rights. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1097; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300. The second type of injunction is a "statutory injunction," which is where a statute either prohibits certain conduct or establishes certain rights enforceable through court injunction, and sets forth the standard for doing so. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1098. The third type is an "All Writs Act injunction," and may be issued by a court whenever it is "calculated in [the court's] sound judgment to achieve the ends of justice entrusted to it." Id. 104 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300-01; see also Barton, 569 F.2d at 1359 ("Conversely, conduct not shown to be detrimental to the court's jurisdiction or exercise thereof could not have been enjoined under the [All Writs Act]." (alteration in original)). Although the two forms' functions are substantially the same, a court issuing an injunction under the Act need not consider the traditional four injunction requirements, because the injunction is ancillary to the original proceeding. See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100-02 105 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 300-01. Thus, the scope of a court's authority to enjoin under the act largely depends on "the nature of the case before [it] and the legitimacy of the ends sought to be achieved through the exercise of the power." Barton, 569 F.2d at 1358-59 (alteration in original). 106 
B. The All Writs Act in the Federal District Courts: General Requirements
Generally, the All Writs Act imbues federal courts with flexible, inherently equitable powers subject to judicial discretion. 109 This discretion is informed by several fundamental limitations and equitable considerations.
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Most courts and commentators have recognized four elements to consider, with some slight variation, before an All Writs order may be properly issued. 111 In short, an All Writs order may only be issued where (1) no other law applies; (2) the issuing court has jurisdiction over the underlying matter on an independent basis and the order is "in aid of" that jurisdiction; (3) exceptional circumstances are present that make issuance under the Act necessary or appropriate; and (4) the issuance of relief is done in conformity with the "usages and principles of law."
112
The first limitation is derived from the Act's residual nature, as its authority may only be invoked as a gap-filling measure to order action not otherwise covered by statute.
113 Although no such limiting language explicitly appears in the statutory text, historically this notion is consistent with 109 See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 537 ("The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable . . . ."); N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 173 (noting that the Court has consistently applied the Act flexibly); United States v. George, 676 F.3d 249, 253 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that the flexible, inherently equitable powers imbued to the courts through the Act "are anchored in informed judicial discretion"). 110 Second, an order under the Act may only be issued "in aid of" the issuing court's jurisdiction. 117 Once jurisdiction is vested in a federal court on an independent basis, that court may invoke the All Writs act "to enter orders it deems necessary or appropriate to preserve and protect its jurisdiction." . 115 Pa. Bureau of Corr., 474 U.S. at 43; see also Clinton, 526 U.S. at 537 ("The All Writs Act invests a court with a power essentially equitable and, as such, not generally available to provide alternatives to other, adequate remedies at law."). The Court went on to add that any authority under the Act should be reserved for filling "statutory interstices," rather than issuing "ad hoc writs" whenever compliance with alternative procedures appears inconvenient or less appropriate. This inquiry becomes slightly more involved where the relief sought is a further order to effectuate a previously issued order, warrant, or judgment. 119 In this context, there must be some previously issued court order, unable to be implemented, that necessitates a further order to aid in its execution. 120 Third, after determining that no other law occupies the space and there is an independent basis for jurisdiction, courts consider whether issuance under the Act is "necessary or appropriate." 121 This has often required a showing of "exceptional circumstances" that makes relief necessary to protect the issuing court's jurisdiction. 122 This inquiry often involves a combination of some identifiable threat to a court's jurisdiction, such as refusal to comply with a previous order, and lack of readily available alternative mechanisms for mitigating that threat. 123 Further considerations in conduct- district court's authority under the All Writs Act to enjoin related federal proceedings in order to preserve the settlement fund of defendants involved in a conditional nationwide class action, to avoid inconsistent results, and to preserve judicial resources); U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 1043 (finding exceptional circumstances where a defendant had "disappeared," efforts to locate him had been unsuccessful, and records collected under a pen register would likely lead to his whereabouts). 123 See Klay, 376 F.3d at 1100; Portnoi, supra note 100, at 299-300. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained that the primary purpose of the Act is to enable courts to protect their jurisdiction. See Clinton, 526 U.S. at 534; Harris, 394 U.S. at 299; Sousa, supra note 93, at 113. In 1977, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., Justice White, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court, rejected the dissent's attempt to draw a distinction between orders in aid of a court's own duties and jurisdiction and orders designed to better enable a party to effectuate his or her own rights and duties. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175 n.23 ("[C]ourts normally exercise their jurisdiction only in order to protect the legal rights of parties."). Thus, although the Act is not ing this inquiry include whether there are less intrusive means available to accomplish the purpose of the request; whether other means have been attempted and were unsuccessful; and the likelihood that issuance of an injunction under the Act will successfully accomplish the purported goal of the requested order. 124 Overall, the inquiry is a flexible one, but subject to sound discretion. 125 For example, in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correction, the Court held that the All Writs Act did not authorize a district court to order the U.S. Marshals Service to transport and supervise a witness being held in a state correctional custody to effectuate a previously issued habeas corpus order. 126 The Court concluded that the district court was not authorized to do so because no "exceptional circumstances" were demonstrated that suggested the state could not handle transporting the witness to the federal courthouse itself. 127 Fourth, after finding sufficient exceptional circumstances that make an All Writs injunction necessary or appropriate, a court must fashion a remebroadly available as a remedy to protect a parties rights, the Act's purpose of preserving the issuing court's jurisdiction most often has the simultaneous effect of protecting parties' rights. See id. 124 circumstances present where arrest warrant had issued for defendant, agent stated that defendant had disappeared, efforts to locate defendant had been unsuccessful, and it was likely that an order under the Act directing nonparty to provide access security videotapes would provide information regarding defendant's whereabouts); U.S. v. X, 601 F. Supp. at 1042-43 (finding exceptional circumstances where a defendant had "disappeared," efforts to locate him had been unsuccessful, and an order directing third-party service provider to disclose records collected under a pen register would likely lead to his whereabouts because he was likely to use his phone to contact his family); see also Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 n.4 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that a district court may only invoke the All Writs Act to remove an otherwise unremovable state court action when there is a showing of "exceptional circumstances").
dy that is "agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 128 This largely depends on the context in which the order is being issued, but generally, any order issued under the Act cannot offend established common law principles relative to the particular relief being sought, or otherwise be in violation of any statutory or constitutional provision. 129 For example, in the context of criminal proceedings or government investigations, courts must determine whether any constitutional provisions are implicated by the proposed order. 130 Where no Fourth Amendment privacy rights or other constitutional issues are implicated, however, courts have invoked the All Writs Act to order third-party assistance in effectuating previously issued search and arrest warrants. 166, 190, 194 (1867) (noting that the single restriction on the courts' authority to exercise its jurisdiction is that the form and mode of process be agreeable to the principles and usages of law as known to both common law and the law of the various states at the time of the Act's enactment). 129 at *2 (ordering production of video surveillance of public areas in an apartment complex, finding no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the tenants or their hallway visitors, and cooperation by the apartment complex would not be burdensome); Doe, 537 F. Supp. at 839-40 (issuing an order under the All Writs Act authorizing the production of toll records finding no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the subscribers).
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C. Compelling Third Parties to Provide Assistance to the Government
The All Writs Act can be used to order nonparties to either assist or refrain from frustrating a previously issued warrant, even where there has been no affirmative interference. 132 In 1977, in United States v. New York Telephone Co., the U.S. Supreme Court held that a district court had authority under the Act to issue an order requiring a public telephone company to provide technical assistance to the FBI in its effort to install a pen register on two telephone lines pursuant to a previously issued warrant. 133 The Court determined that the Act authorized the district court to issue the second order directing assistance, because it was necessary to prevent the warrant from being nullified, thus aiding in the courts jurisdiction to enable the authorized surveillance. 134 This determination hinged on the Court's conclusion that the telephone company was not a third party "so far removed" from the underlying investigation that its assistance could not be permissibly compelled. 135 The 1979) ; see also Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of Conn., Inc. v. Thorne, 30 F.3d 367, 370 (2d Cir. 1994) ("By power of the All Writs Act, [a court] may require the compliance of nonparties in order to ensure that its legally-mandated directives are not frustrated." (alteration in original)); Doe, 537 F. Supp. at 839 (using the All Writs Act to order telephone company to supply telephone toll records in order to help effectuate a bench warrant for defendant's arrest); In re XXX, Inc., 2014 WL 5510865, at *1-2 (issuing an order under the All Writs Act directing cellphone manufacturer to assist in the execution of a search warrant by "bypassing the lock screen" of subject's cellphone). 133 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-78. A "pen register" is a device used to record numbers dialed on a telephone by measuring electronic impulses caused when the dial of the telephone is released. See id. at 161 n.1. The case before the Court arose from the telephone company's refusal to fully comply with a previously issued order from the district court, which directed it to furnish the FBI all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to use the pen registers unobtrusively. Id. at 162. The FBI contended that it needed the assistance of the company in order to successfully install the pen register on the target lines without alerting the suspects. See id. at . 134 See id. at 175 & n.23. The court noted that there was no conceivable way the FBI could install the pen register on its own without tipping off the targets of the investigation. See id. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the telephone company's argument that pen registers may only be authorized in conformity with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 ("The Wiretap Act"). See id. at 165-67; Brian L. Owsley, Triggerfish, Stingrays, and Fourth Amendment Fishing Expeditions, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 183, 195 (2014) . The Court concluded that Title III was only concerned with orders authorizing "interception of wire communication," and that pen registers did not fit within the meaning of the statute because they only disclose the telephone numbers that have been 136 Furthermore, the Court also recognized the limits to the district court's authority to issue such orders, and noted that "unreasonable burdens may not be imposed." 137 Although the practical import of New York Telephone Co. in the context of pen-register surveillance has largely dissipated, the Court's rationale regarding the All Writs Act has survived.
138 New York Telephone Co. still stands for the contention that the All Writs Act empowers federal courts to order a nonparty to an investigation to provide technical assistance to effectuate a prior order or warrant.
139 Despite this purported authority, lower Cir. 2002) . But see In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 368 (concluding that the requisite "minimum contacts," for the purposes of establishing personal jurisdiction, and the "too far removed" standard articulated in New York Telephone Co. are not coextensive). 136 N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 175. The Court rejected the concern that such a holding could establish an undesirable precedent for federal courts' authority to impress unwilling aid on third parties. See id. at 164, 175 n.24. The Court noted that the conviction that private citizens have a duty to provide assistance to law enforcement officials in necessary situations has been generally accepted by common-law traditions. See id. at 175 n.24. 137 Id. at 172. In the wake of New York Telephone Co., lower courts recognized that such assistance orders cannot be compelled without providing the target of the order a right to be heard. .) ), 610 F.2d 1148, 1157 (3d Cir. 1779). These three aforementioned factors-(1) how "far removed" the target of the order is from the underlying matter; (2) the amount of effort required for the requested action, and its potential disruption to business operations; and (3) the necessity of the order in aiding the court's jurisdiction-have been referred to as the New York Telephone Co. "discretionary factors." See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 363-64. The degree of permissible burden is ultimately up to the district court's discretion, but at least one federal appeals court has directed lower courts to give considerable weight to the "sui generis character" of the technical assistance requested and the extent to which the target entity is regulated. See Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1132. 138 courts have generally held that procedural guarantees of due process require notice and a hearing on the issue of burdensomeness before assistance can be compelled. 140 An order shall not issue if the assistance sought would be unreasonably burdensome to the nonparty. 141 The degree of burdensomeness can be determined by balancing the government's need for assistance against the nonparty's interest in its own autonomy.
III. SOUR APPLES: APPLE FINALLY BUCKS GOVERNMENT'S ORDER APPLICATIONS UNDER THE ALL WRITS ACT
On October 8, 2015, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, the government sought an order, pursuant to the All Writs Act, to direct Apple to bypass the lock-screen passcode of an iPhone 5s running on iOS 7, in order to effectuate a previously issued search warrant. 143 . 2003 ) ("The obligation of private citizens to assist law enforcement, even if they are compensated for the immediate costs of doing so, has not extended to circumstances in which there is a complete disruption of a service they offer to a customer as part of their business . . . ."); In re Apple-Preliminary Mem. and Order, 2015 WL 5920207, at *6 (discussing case law in which courts have considered the extent of intrusion that constitutes "unreasonably burdensome"). 142 See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 F.2d at 1155. Relevant factors for determining reasonableness have included: (1) the likelihood of obtaining probative evidence; (2) available alternatives for accessing the information; (3) the extent to which assistance would disrupt operations or a commercial service; (4) the extent to which the invasiveness implicated by the execution of the order can be curtailed; (5) whether there is probable cause that the nonparty's facilities are being used for a criminal purpose; (6) whether the nonparty operates in a regulated industry; and (7) the likelihood that the nonparty can be compensated for assistance. See N.Y. Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 174-75; In re Pen Register or Touch-Tone (3d Cir.), 610 F.2d at 1155 (finding All Writs Act assistance order to be appropriate and not overly burdensome where refusal would completely preclude execution of the warrant; assistance would cause "minimal disruption of normal operations;" and the telephone companies at issue would be fully compensated); see also Mountain States Tel., 616 F.2d at 1133 (providing a variation of those factors in dicta). On February 29, 2016, following further briefing and argument on the propriety of the Act's authority and the issue of burdensomeness, the court issued a final ruling denying the government's application. 145 On March 7, 2016, the government appealed U.S. Magistrate Judge James Orenstein's decision to the District Court, however, it subsequently withdrew its application altogether after reporting that an unidentified individual had provided it with the passcode to the phone at issue. 146 147 Section B briefly discusses the larger significance of the holding, as almost a dozen All-Writsorder applications against Apple were pending before other federal magistrates across the country at the time the ruling was entered. 
A. Magistrate Judge Orenstein: Placing the Apple Out of Reach
Judge Orenstein's principle holding was that the All Writs Act did not authorize the relief being sought, because an order compelling Apple to provide unwilling technical assistance would not be "agreeable to the usages and principles of law," as the Act demands.
149 Judge Orenstein based this conclusion on a finding that Congress had sufficiently considered legislation that would require governmental access to encrypted devices but has declined to adopt it. 150 Accordingly, Judge Orenstein concluded that granting relief under the Act would essentially be legislative in nature and repugnant to the doctrine of separation of powers.
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Before reaching its conclusion, Judge Orenstein engaged in the statutory construction of the "usages and principles" provision, finding that federal case law offered little guidance on the matter. 152 In so doing, Judge Oren- 151 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 349-50, 360-61, 370 n.36. Judge Orenstein noted that granting authority to the executive branch that Congress decided to withhold would be an unwarranted expansion of the Act's original purpose of ensuring the "smooth functioning" of the judiciary itself. See id. at 360-61; see also Holt, supra note 94, at 1507-08 (describing section 14, known as the "all-writs" provision, as "the most expansive and open-ended" provision in the First Judiciary Act). To be sure, writs have routinely been issued for "minor" administrative purposes from the beginning, but have also been reserved to be used to deal with "matters of great moment" through the Act's open-ended language. Holt, supra note 94, at 1507. 152 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 352, 357-59. But see Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 56 (1825) (finding the provision "embraces writs sanctioned by the principles and usages" under common law, but is not so limited); Kerr, supra note 149 (analyzing the Court's interpretation of the Act in United States v. Halstead and other cases, and concluding that the Court has consistently interpreted the Act to convey broad authority to the federal courts to issue writs beyond the forms available at common law, which will only be limited if Congress acts to do so). Judge Orenstein considered several cases in a footnote, but determined that in those cases the "usages and principles" provision was mainly concerned with whether the form of the writ sought was available under common law. stein determined that the most apt interpretation of the phrase was to permit only those orders that are "consonant with both the manner in which the laws were developed . . . and the manner in which the laws have been interpreted and implemented . . . ." 153 In recognizing the Act's overall residual nature, Judge Orenstein then turned to potentially relevant legislation to determine whether a statutory gap had emerged that would make relief under the Act appropriate. 154 He agreed with both parties that the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") does not require a company like Apple to provide assistance in this context, but diverged with the government's position by concluding that the omission reflects a conscious choice rather than simple oversight. 155 Judge Orenstein reasoned that CALEA is part of a larger, comprehensive scheme, and that scheme delineates the boundaries within which law enforcement may seek access to data in-motion and data at-rest. 156 He concluded that an absence of an affirmative obligation on a company like Apple to assist in accessing data at rest is sufficient to imply a legislative decision to prohibit the imposition of such a duty. . 154 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 354-58. Specifically, Judge Orenstein noted that the boundaries of the Act's gap-filling function could be easily drawn at two ends: (1) the Act cannot be interpreted to empower courts to do something already specifically authorized by another statute, and (2) it cannot be interpreted to authorize something specifically prohibited by another statute. See id. (citing Pa. Bureau of Corr. v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 474 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) ("Where a statute specifically addresses the particular issue at hand, it is that authority, and not the All Writs Act, that is controlling."). 155 See id. 355-57, 363. To be sure, the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") only applies to the real-time interception of communications, whereas the underlying warrant authorized the search of data at rest, so it is likewise arguable that CALEA is not relevant to the underlying matter. 158 Judge Orenstein primarily based this conclusion on the view that Apple was too far removed from the underlying investigation to be permissibly compelled to assist in execution of the warrant, and that the assistance order in this context would be inequitable for a number of reasons. 159 Furthermore, Judge Orenstein concluded that the government failed to establish that Apple's assistance in bypassing the lock screen was an absolute necessity, due to seemingly conflicting statements it had made in relation to the availability of third-party technologies and hacking tools. 174 (1977) ). Specifically, Judge Orenstein noted that the record was replete with anything suggesting that Apple should be subject to greater regulation than any other business, and it does have a cognizable interest in choosing to design its products with uncompromising data security and declining to make an exception for the government. See id. at 369-70, 369 n.34. Judge Orenstein distinguished Apple from the telephone company in New York Telephone Co. in noting that Apple is not a highly regulated public utility, and it has no ownership interest in the phone, software, or anything else believed to have been used in connection with a criminal enterprise. See id. at 363-66. Additionally, Judge Orenstein determined that bypassing the lock-screen of a phone is not something Apple would normally do in the conduct of its own business, and due to its general initiative to be a leader in consumer data security, assistance could threaten its relationship with its consumers. See id. at 369. Thus, the situation was distinguishable from that in New York Telephone Co. Id. Similarly, Judge Orenstein noted that the burden on Apple would go well beyond the financial costs of diverting resources away from business operations, and would pose an irreconcilable threat to Apple's autonomy. See id. at 369-71. 160 See id. at 373-75. Judge Orenstein was primarily concerned with the testimony of a U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") expert from another case, in which the expert indicated that the DHS was in possession of technology that would allow its forensic technicians to override the passcode of some iPhones and extract the phone's data. See id. (citing United States v. Djibo, 151 F. Supp. 3d 297, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). The government further noted that in this case, it could not risk using the forensic tool at issue to try to guess the password, because ten unsuccessful attempts may erase all of the phone's data; and even if that feature had not been enabled, the government may be unable to bypass a strong password before trial. See id. at 374. Additionally, the government indicated that the owner of the phone, the criminally charged in the underlying matter, had asserted that he forgot the password for the phone. See id. at 366 n.31. It further noted that even if he was not being truthful, to compel him to enter the password would raise significant Fifth Amendment issues, which could lead to a suppression of any evidence gathered from the phone. See id. Finally, the technique necessary for bypassing the phone without risking permanent loss of the data subject to the search warrant requires authentication from Apple servers, and can only be performed at Apple's facilities in Cupertino, California. See In re Apple, Inc., Transcript of Oct. 26, 2015, supra note 14, at 32-33, 63-64 ("We agree with the government that the system requires Apple authentication.").
B. Judge Orenstein Sets the Tone for the Encryption Debate in the Courts
Prior to Judge Orenstein's decision, Apple conceded that it has the ability to extract certain categories of unencrypted data from password protected devices running iOS 7 or earlier, but would not be able to do so on devices running on iOS 8 or higher. 161 It further argued that an order to perform this service would be unduly burdensome if extrapolated to a significant scale, but conceded that performing such service on one device would not impose any immediate financial or resource-based burden on the company. 162 At oral arguments, the government indicated that since 2008, Apple had received and complied with at least seventy court orders requiring technical assistance pursuant to the All Writs Act. 163 Apple indicated that it had purposefully taken itself out of a position to provide such assistance by developing iOS 8. 164 According to Apple, it was now asserting its first challenge because it no longer believed that the All Writs Act provided the authority the government had long claimed. 165 Between October 2015 and February 2016, at least nine additional All Writs orders were issued by federal courts across the country directing Apple to assist the government to bypass the passcodes of a dozen iPhones running on a variety of iOS versions, all pursuant to the All Writs Act. 166 withdrawn, a magistrate judge in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California went as far as directing Apple to create and load Applesigned software onto the target phone to enable the government to circumvent the data-wiping protocol and access the phone's data with the help of forensic tools. 167 Many quickly voiced opposition to the order, arguing that forcing Apple to write software unwillingly constitutes compelled speech, in violation of the First Amendment. 168 In re Apple, Inc. represents the first case in which a decision has been entered regarding the propriety of the All Writs Act's authority for compelling technical assistance of this type. 169 It remains to be seen whether the other courts will follow Judge Orenstein's lead and hold the Act inapplicable as a matter of law; withhold issuance on the grounds of burdensomeness; or grant the relief requested and order Apple to provide technical assistance. 171 The Act's availability, however, is lim-ited to situations where such assistance will not be overly burdensome. 172 Thus, a less ephemeral solution will be needed to preserve the integrity of the warrant process; a responsibility that lies in the hands of Congress. 173 This Part argues that Judge Orenstein's principle holding in In re Apple, Inc. was incorrect and the product of improper statutory construction, however, obtaining assistance orders under the All Writs Act is not a viable solution to Going Dark in the long term. 174 The All Writs Act does authorize decryption-assistance orders as long as they are issued in conjunction with a device search warrant. 175 Application of the Act in this context comports with prior precedent, because full-disk, device encryption sits within a statutory gap that has only recently emerged and, in some instances, there is no feasible way to execute a warrant on an encrypted device without Apple's assistance. 176 Section A of this Part argues that Judge Orenstein improperly construed the "usages and principles" provision of the Act; that there is no comprehensive statutory scheme that precludes the Act's use in this context; and that the Act does generally authorize decryption assistance orders.
177 Section B argues that, despite the Act's present applicability, using the Act to compel Apple to unlock iPhones running on iOS 8 or higher will eventually be unavailable due to judicial restraint, because of the undue burden those orders are likely to impose. 178 Section C argues that, by stripping the government of its reliance on the Act for unlocking iPhones, such judicial rulings should invigorate the push for legislative solutions to the Going Dark problem. 179 It will further offer an amendment to the Communication Assistance to Law Enforcement Act ("CALEA") that would effectively extend compliance requirements to device manufacturers as one possible solution. To reach the court's principle holding in In re Apple, Inc., Judge Orenstein first constructed the "usages and principles" provision to allow only orders that are consistent with how the law is developed, implemented, and interpreted. 181 This construction, however, was necessarily improper; the "usages and principle" provision has already been constructed by the U.S. Supreme Court to have a different meaning. 182 The Court has long understood the Act's gap-filling function as conferring authority to federal courts to enlarge the effect of their process through fashioning orders as the need presents itself. 183 Moreover, the Court has construed the "usages and principles" provision as limiting the procedural tools available under the Act to only orders that would (1) not be unconstitutional under the circumstances; (2) not be prohibited by any statute; and (3) not be prohibited by any common law principle. 184 Thus, an order that may raise separation of powers concerns or call-to-mind certain statutes covering similar matters, would still be "agreeable" under that alternative construction as long as it was not completely offensive to the doctrine or statutorily prohibited. 185 Under Judge Orenstein's construction, however, such an order would not be agreeable to "usages and principles" because it could be deemed inconsistent with the way laws are developed, implemented, and interpreted. 186 The former construction has precedent, whereas the later has none.
187 Decryptionassistance orders, when sought to help execute a warrant, are consistent with that former construction because they violate no constitutional provision, statute, or common law principle.
188
For example, CALEA does not apply to password encrypted devices and the underlying data at rest, because it is explicitly limited to the interception of real-time communications and call-identifying information transmitted by telecommunications carriers. 189 There may be other piecemeal legislation that could conceivably cover decryption-assistance orders if amended, such as the Stored Communications Act ("SCA"), but currently nothing specifically addresses the propriety of obtaining data at rest from a proves of the judiciaries' actions it is within its power to impose corrective legislation. See Beers v. Haughton, 34 U.S. 329, 360 (1835) (8 Pet.) (approving the constitutionality of Congress's delegation to the courts); Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 60-62. 186 See In re Apple, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 3d at 360-63. Furthermore, an order that seems legislative in nature, and covers an area that has partially been considered by members of Congress, raises sufficient concerns of judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative to support the view that issuing that order would be inconsistent with the manner in which laws are developed, implemented, and interpreted. See id. 187 smartphone beyond the typical warrant requirements. 190 Moreover, no provisions of CALEA or the SCA have been updated since 1996 and 2006, respectively. 191 The iPhone was not released until 2007, and it was not offered with full-disk encryption ("FDE") or remote-wiping capabilities until 2009. 192 Thus, the further development of FDE and data-wipe features since 2009 has created a clear statutory gap. 193 There was no substantial need to seek this type of conscripted assistance prior to those developments, because few data was actually being encrypted at first and passcodes could be bypassed via simple forensic tools. 194 For more securely encrypted phones, Apple regularly provided assistance to the authorities. 195 Therefore, the specific practical inabilities presented in In re Apple, Inc. were largely nonexistent until very recently, so it is difficult to see how they could have been explicitly omitted from legislation after being fully considered. 196 Although some members of Congress have been aware of the Going Dark issue since at least 2011, congressional hearings prior to 2015 focused more predominantly on the difficulties of intercepting real-time data in motion, rather than those associated with obtaining data at rest from physical devices. 197 The difference is significant under the United States v. New York Telephone Co. framework, where the U.S. Supreme Court in 1977 explicitly rejected the argument that pen registers could only be obtained through the seemingly pertinent Wiretap Act or not at all, because that statute did not warrant. 203 Finally, Apple itself had purposefully designed the auto-wipe feature for iOS 7 to thwart the only alternative means of accessing a locked iPhone available to the government. 204 Thus, sufficient exceptional circumstances are present to make a decryption-assistance order in this case necessary to preserve the integrity of the court's previously issued warrant. 205 
B. Apples-to-Apples: Different All Writs Analysis Depending on the Device's Operating System
Due to the discretionary nature of the authority under the All Writs Act, its availability in this context as a matter of law does not mean that orders should be issued in every case. 206 As the In re Apple, Inc. court noted in extensive dicta, the discretionary factors that have been interpreted out of New York Telephone Co., should ultimately determine whether an All Writs order is necessary and not unduly burdensome. 207 Although the court in In re Apple, Inc. concluded that the requested order would be unduly burdensome given the facts, for a number of reasons, other courts could and have found differently under the same or similar circumstances. 208 It would be much more difficult, however, to rectify the burdensomeness of an assistance order seeking access to a phone running iOS 8 or higher, because Apple would most likely have to develop new software or handover source code to the government in order to comply. 209 Aside from the potential First Amendment implications, such an order would present more than a minimal level of disruption to Apple's overall operations, as it would require more research and development than the mere physical labor required to assist with pre-iOS 8 devices. 210 'It is well within the courts' authority to continue issuing decryption-assistance orders under the All Writs Act as long as the burden of compliance imposed on Apple remains relatively minimal. 211 
C. Expand CALEA to Require Cellphone Manufacturers to Maintain Decryption Capabilities When Presented with a Search Warrant
One long-term solution to the device-encryption problem could be to amend and expand CALEA to cover smartphone manufacturers, by requiring telecommunications carriers to retain certain decryption capabilities for devices running on their networks. 212 For example, this could be done by adding a fifth capability requirement to § 1002(a) that mandates telecommunications carriers to ensure that wireless devices sold for use on their networks are amenable to search warrant executions. 213 This would be consistent with the congressional intent underlying the original enactment of CALEA because the mandate would only directly apply to telecomm carriers, and actual access would still be predicated on an independently obtained warrant. 214 It would only indirectly apply to smartphone manufacturers through § 1005, which requires manufacturers to cooperate with telecomm carriers' CALEA compliance efforts. 215 Moreover, this would not necessarily extend CALEA to include all electronic communication services, something that Congress explicitly rejected with the original bill, because an entity could remain excluded insofar as it provides "information 212 See FINKLEA, supra note 6, at 7, 10-11. 213 . 214 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-827, pt. 1, at 18 (1994). Congress narrowed the scope of CALEA's compliance requirements to telecomm carriers, and explicitly excluded information services to accommodate privacy concerns and avoid wide-sweeping technological impediments. See id. at 18-19. CALEA's stated purpose, however, was to preserve the government's ability to intercept communications that use advanced technology. See id. at 9. Thus, the statutory scheme reflects a balancing of interests; for example, application of compliance was limited to common carriers because they were entities that law enforcement most regularly served with surveillance orders. See id. at 18. Congress noted that a broader approach that included all providers of electronic communication services would not be practical, nor would it be justified to meet any law enforcement need. Id. This rationale also presumed that other services could be wiretapped pursuant to court order, which they must cooperate with under existing law. Id.
215 47 U.S.C. § 1005. As it is currently written, requires manufacturers of telecomm transmission equipment, which ostensibly includes Apple, to make available such features or modifications necessary to allow covered carriers to comply with capability requirements under § 1002(a).
services." 216 Furthermore, § 1002(b)(2)'s encryption exemption would be amended to also cover equipment manufacturers. 217 This would exempt carriers and manufacturers from being responsible for decrypting communications and devices encrypted by a subscriber or customer, but would require decryption assistance if the encryption was provided by that carrier or manufacturer. 218 With this solution, the government is only mandating access in the general sense, rather than a specific access point that may contain untenable privacy vulnerabilities. 219 Allowing the private industry to come up with the most viable solution on its own terms, rather than mandating a specific key system would still allow for innovation and competition in the cryptology field. 220 This notion of requiring private entities to maintain capabilities to
